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中国明斯基时刻 即将到来?

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发表于 2017-11-3 19:09 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-4 08:10 | 显示全部楼层
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-4 08:19 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 aidj 于 2017-11-4 08:24 编辑

China: Shadow Bank Inflows Are Critical To Sustain The Ponzi... But They're Falling

by Tyler Durden
Nov 3, 2017 7:40 PM

3

During the Party Congress, even China’s somewhat watered down versus of the free markets was suspended so as not to disturb the glorification of Xi Jinping as the nation’s greatest leader since Mao. Returning to “business as usual”, some commentators have been disturbed by the continued rise in government bond yields with the 10-year hitting 3.93% earlier this week.
Bloomberg described it this morning as a “tumultuous few days”.
We also noted Huachuang Securities Co. comment that bond holders may be about to get hit by “daggers falling from the sky,” if the Party adopts more aggressive deleveraging policies. In a far less sensationalist way,the Wall Street Journal has attempted a post-mortem on the recent sell-off in the Chinese government bond market.



Catching sight of a chain reaction in China’s markets is rare.

Carrying out a postmortem of a recent selloff in China’s $9 trillion bond market shows how it is becoming harder for Beijing to untangle its increasingly intertwined financial system. In the aftermath of China’s twice-a-decade party congress last week, yields on benchmark 10-year Chinese government bonds spiked to 3.9%, their highest in three years. Government bond futures fell.

Reasons proffered for the sudden rout ranged from expectations of higher U.S. interest rates to general fearmongering.

Having acknowledged the growing complexity of China’s financial system, WSJ provides a valuable insight, noting the relative stability of corporate bond yields during the recent sell-off in the government sector...




An important anomaly to note about the bond rout: as government bonds sold off, yields on less-liquid, unsecured Chinese corporate bonds barely moved.

That is atypical in an environment of rising rates - usually, bond investors shed their less-liquid holdings and hold on to assets that are more easily tradable, like government debt.
Using this handy (kind of) diagram of flows in China’s financial system...
可参考 瑞银重磅报告:14万亿中国影子信贷分布图 - 华尔街见闻


....WSJ tries to explain “how the selloff in China really worked”.
In essence what happened is that, as funding costs for Chinese banks have risen, they have been forced to compensate by placing more money in the shadow banking sector, with all the risks that entails (i.e. leverage and risky assets). Here’s the Journal’s version.




Let’s start with the travails of China’s small and midsize lenders that—like most banks—fund themselves by taking in customer deposits and by borrowing in wholesale markets.

In China, the latter has increasingly meant issuing short-term bonds known as NCDs, or negotiable certificates of deposit. The trouble for Chinese banks of late is that both these funding sources have become expensive: Borrowing costs have risen as Beijing pursues its deleveraging campaign, while bank-deposit growth has also been slowing.

To balance out these rising costs, banks have been placing more of their money with so-called nonbank financial institutions—the likes of trust companies, funds and securities companies—that offer high returns from investing in various markets, from bonds to stocks and commodities.

Deposits placed by banks with these nonbanks - the bulwarks of China’s infamous shadow banking system - had grown to more than $4 trillion as of September this year.
Okay, this is where things get more interesting.
Please bear in mind that (as we’ll explain later) a key pillar supporting the stability of China’s financial system is the maintenance of rising flows into the Chinese shadow banks.
This Bloomberg chartshows the rapid growth in China’s shadow banking system in recent years.
The WSJ explains that the reduction in flows into the shadow banks has led to redemptions and something had to be sold quickly...




But with less funds coming into banks now, less can go out. That has led to trouble for the nonbanks, which, after years of only ever-higher inflows, have started facing redemptions.

Banks’ claims on nonbanks have dropped 2% since peaking in June, according to Wind Info, equivalent to a $90 billion withdrawal of funds.

In addition to these redemptions, the cost for nonbanks of juicing returns on their investments by leveraging up has also risen because of the higher interest rates mentioned above.

That brings us to the bond market. Faced with redemptions, nonbanks have needed to sell something, and quickly. Offloading highly liquid government bonds has proven the easiest option.

Meanwhile, the nonbanks have held on to their higher-yielding corporate bonds, which at least have the benefit of helping them to maintain high returns.
We think that the Journal’s analysis is correct…but it doesn’t fully appreciate the bigger picture regarding shadow banks’ need to “maintain high returns”.
China’s shadow banks are, in part, engaged in Ponzi schemes, for example in the $4 trillion Wealth Management Products (WMP) sector. In May 2017, Forsea Insurance, one of China’s largest insurers, warned that there would be “mass defaults and social unrest” if it was prevented from selling new WMPs to meet payouts. See “Chinese Insurer Warns Of ‘Mass Defaults, Social Unrest’ Due To ‘Mass Redemption’ Run”.
A month earlier, Minsheng Bank(民生银行), China’s largest private bank, was found to have committed a RMB 3.0bn fraud by selling non-existent WMPs. See “Investors Rage After 3 Billion Yuan Vanish From China's Largest Private Bank”.
The sell-off in Chinese government bonds implies that the deleverage in shadow bankingwe identified in September in beginning to bite.
We are in the last lap of the Chinese Ponzi as, piece by piece, the whole decrepit system is being exposed. In the end, it will boil down to how many trillions of RMB the PBoC needs to print to make the banks and their shadow banking relatives whole.




焦点新闻
金榜集团(00172)以1470万元认购民生银行结构性存款

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-6 11:34 | 显示全部楼层
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-6 16:05 | 显示全部楼层
近期中国规模9万亿美元的债市大跌,说明中国的金融体系越来越错综复杂,政府

整顿的难度越来越大。 https://t.co/mDrjUYHCUS

PBOC's Zhou Warns Of "Sudden, Complex, Hidden, Contagious, Hazardous" Risks In Global Markets
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/20 ... isks-global-markets

Just two weeks after warning of the potential for an imminent 'Minsky Moment', Chinese central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan has penned a lengthy article on The PBOC's website that warns ominously of latent risks accumulating, including some that are "hidden, complex, sudden, contagious and hazardous," even as the overall health of the financial system appears good.

中国杠杆率问题怎么看、怎么办、怎么干?
http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001074904?full=y7

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-12 12:05 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 aidj 于 2017-11-12 12:07 编辑
aidj 发表于 2017-11-4 08:19
China: Shadow Bank Inflows Are Critical To Sustain The Ponzi... But They're Falling

by Tyler Durd ...


中文 (简、不完整)
https://hk.finance.yahoo.com/new ... C%9F-043245558.html

付费(WSJ)上面链接同

中国债市为何持续暴跌? - 华尔街见闻
https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3038085
2017年10月30日 - 周一债市继续暴跌,十年期国债期货创逾10个月单日最大跌幅。分析认为,债市在近期持续暴跌的背后,除了市场对金融监管加强的预期,还包括对

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-13 16:51 | 显示全部楼层
5年期国债利率破4%心理关口 债券市场在经历怎样的“去杠杆”?
2017-11-13 12:59:33

周浩 https://m.wallstreetcn.com/articles/3040838

摘要:国债利率在过去几周内连续上升,市场杠杆率没下滑,市场仍在选择死守。市场也一直在抵挡10年国债利率上行,只要10年利率不崩盘,那么债券头寸大幅的“市价损失”就不会被投资者过度关注。


股涨债跌再现 国债现券、期货大跌 五年期国债现券收益率涨破4%
2017-11-13 11:54:24

曹泽熙 https://m.wallstreetcn.com/articles/3040815

摘要:周一早盘,银行、券商、保险等大金融板块全线走强,其中银行板块表现尤为活跃。债市则继续下挫。中国10年期国债现券收益率刷新2014年来新高,5年期国债现券收益率涨破4%。

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-15 18:20 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 aidj 于 2017-11-15 18:29 编辑

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点评

长期资金的短缺说明了什么?10年期国债收益率三年来首破4% 别惊讶,还会更高  发表于 2017-11-17 10:39

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-16 08:07 | 显示全部楼层
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-16 16:39 | 显示全部楼层
黄奇帆:
房地产税当然要收 今后年内会发生


穷人买盘集中的地区,包括一二线城市的远郊以及各N线落后地区,完全成为被人遗忘无人提及的崩盘角落。

房地产崩盘后(中国)政府不会救市,最大可能是开征房产税。银行业资金已经断裂,不会再对无药可救的房地产放贷,而且银行即使有钱,也可能放弃


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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-21 17:14 | 显示全部楼层
新浪财经讯,11月21日,中国10年期国债收益率涨3个基点至4%。



本月曾突破过4%

11月13日,10年期国债期货大跌0.67%,5年期国债收益率盘中突破4%,10年期国债收益率窜升至3.98%;11月14日,10年期国债收益率突破4%关口,债市步入严冬时期。

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-22 18:44 | 显示全部楼层

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-22 22:27 | 显示全部楼层

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-23 18:12 | 显示全部楼层

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-24 14:09 | 显示全部楼层
22日,中共央行行长周小川再次在党媒刊文称,金融风险易发高发的潜在和隐患正在积累。周小川曾在十九大会议期间爆出中国经济隐藏大范围债务违约风险,并在11月初撰文称,中国金融正处在风险易发高发期。即将退休的周小川为何一再对中国经济发出警告?专家认为其另有目的。

11月22日,中共央行行长周小川在人民日报刊发近6,000字长文,敦促中共加快金融改革开放,以防控系统性金融风险。周小川在文中称,〝当前和今后一个时期,中国金融领域尚处在风险易发高发期,潜在风险和隐患正在积累,脆弱性明显上升,既要防止‘黑天鹅’事件发生,也要防止‘灰犀牛’风险发生〞。

〝黑天鹅〞是经济术语,意指意想不到的风险的突然集中爆发,〝灰犀牛〞则指金融风险在爆发前已有迹像显现,却遭到人为忽视。

事实上,这已经不是周小川第一次预警中国有金融危机的风险了。

10月19日,中九大中央金融系统代表团讨论会上,周小川表示:〝如果经济中的顺周期因素太多,使这个周期波动被巨大地放大,在繁荣的时期过于乐观,也会造成矛盾的积累,到一定时候就会出现所谓‘明斯基时刻’。〞

〝明斯基时刻〞是以美国已故经济学家海曼.明斯基(Hyman Minsky)命名的经济术语,是指经济体中隐藏的风险突然全面暴露,资产价格暴跌,导致大范围违约。

明斯基认为,金融市场具有内生的不稳定性,因为繁荣时期会带来过度的乐观情绪和不负责任的由债务助推的投资。

11月4日,周小川再次发表文章说,中国金融正处在风险易发高发期,金融风险归为三类,第一类是宏观层面的金融高杠杆率和流动性风险,第二类是微观层面的金融机构信用风险,第三类是跨市场跨业态跨区域的影子银行和违法犯罪风险,少数金融〝大鳄〞与握有审批权、监管权的〝内鬼〞合谋等。

即将退休的周小川为什么一再对中国经济发出警告?

美国南卡罗莱纳大学,艾肯商学院教授谢田分析说:〝中共官员在下台之前和下台之后往往没那么多顾忌,敢于把现在的现状揭示出来,还有一个可能他要摆脱干系,虽然是在我任期上发生的,但是我现在也警告你们了给自己撇清。

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-11-29 11:49 | 显示全部楼层
Chinese Stock Rout Continues Despite Government Ban On Selling Shares
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/20 ... -ban-selling-shares

Chinese Stock Rout Resumes As Top Fund Sees "High Probability" Of Bond Carnage
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/20 ... out-going-get-worse

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 楼主| 发表于 2017-12-8 17:09 | 显示全部楼层
IMF Stress Tests Find $280 Billion Black Hole In Chinese Banks' Capital
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/20 ... inese-banks-capital

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 楼主| 发表于 2018-2-11 19:13 | 显示全部楼层
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-6-8 22:40 | 显示全部楼层
“总体而言,我们预计2018年将是全球经济强劲增长的一年,与2017年相近。 新兴市场国家金融市场持续动荡,对经济增长的负面溢出效应扩大至包括阿根廷和土耳其在内的一系列国家。而另一个风险是高油价将削弱购买力,并对通胀带来上行风险。”


谁最令IMF担心?新兴市场溢出效应最新全盘推演
作者: 见智宏观研究
2016-04-07 10:02
https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/234579

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 楼主| 发表于 2019-8-15 08:35 | 显示全部楼层
戴老板 最近 很安静

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